wYLDS — Risk Report
Moderate risk · 5.5 / 10 Wrapped token · Ethereum + Solana · Issuer: Hastra (Signum Ltd.), backed by Figure’s YLDS · 606,675,080 wYLDS across both chains, measured 2026-09-11 · verified 2026-09-11
Summary
wYLDS is Hastra’s 1:1 wrapper of YLDS, a face-amount certificate issued by Figure Certificate Company (FCC). Retail users mint wYLDS with USDC without KYC; Hastra, the regulated-market participant, acquires and holds YLDS. Yield of around 3% is distributed as additional wYLDS tokens, so the token price targets about $1 rather than appreciating; the rate floats with short-term interest rates. wYLDS is also the layer Hastra PRIME returns when a holder unstakes.
The strongest evidence for the underlying comes from outside Hastra. FCC is a full SEC reporting registrant (CIK 0001974395, also see ylds.com), filing 10-K and 10-Q financial statements with officer certifications. KPMG issued a clean audit opinion on the FY2025 annual statements without a going-concern qualification or material weakness. FCC’s own interim filing carries a liquidity and going-concern note in which it concludes it has twelve months of funding specifically because its parent has committed, by letter, to pay its invoices directly and periodically forgive intercompany balances. This is a conditional conclusion resting on parent support, not an independent one. At March 31, 2026, FCC’s unaudited Q1 interim filing disclosed $601.524M of Investment Company Act §28 qualified assets against a $599.706M certificate reserve—just over 100% coverage. Independent chain reads and Hastra’s proof of reserves also show wrapper coverage above 100%. These sources agree on the direction, but they measure different things on different dates.
The asset detail is unusually useful. Qualified assets consisted of $211.3M of Level 1 US Treasuries and money-market funds and $389.6M of Level 2 repo collateralized by US Treasuries, with no Level 3 assets. Cash held outside the investment portfolio was just $0.7M, at a single bank. Roughly 65% of the pool was repo rather than outright government securities. ⚠️ At 30 June 2026 that repo book faces two counterparties, not one — and the second was already documented, sitting unused. A dormant facility was drawn from zero to $200,000K inside one quarter while the UMB leg fell from $389.556M to $82,361K. FCC’s Q2 10-Q, Schedule I:
| counterparty | amount | share |
|---|---|---|
| Hidden Road Partners CIV US LLC | $200,000K | 70.8% |
| UMB Bank N.A. | $82,361K | 29.2% |
UMB remains the custodian, holding $555,722K of investments on deposit under Schedule V. ⚠️ So the exposure that used to sit in a single name — repo counterparty and custodian together — is now split, and the larger share sits with a counterparty that does not hold the custody. The collateral is overnight Treasuries, so collateral quality is unchanged.
✅ Hidden Road Partners CIV US LLC is identifiable, and the answer runs the other way from what an unnamed counterparty implies. From its own audited SEC filing (CIK 0002029588, X-17A-5 filed 2026-02-27, audited by RSM US LLP): a Delaware LLC registered with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant, an NFA member and a CME clearing member. ⚠️ Its ultimate parent is Ripple Labs Inc. — the filing states it in terms: “On October 21, 2025, the Company’s ultimate parent changed as a result of the acquisition of Hidden Road Inc. by Ripple Labs Inc.” (Press dates that close to 10-24; the audited filing says 10-21.)
✅ And the balance sheet explains why the leverage headline is not the finding it looks like. At 2025-12-31: assets $39.019B against member’s equity $520.4M — about 75:1 — but reverse repo $38.183B against repo $37.770B. That is a matched book: offsetting financing legs, which is what a repo dealer is, not a directional position. ✅ FCC’s $200M is 0.51% of that book, and the collateral is overnight Treasuries.
⚠️ What does survive, and it is about correlation rather than credit. UMB is a bank — it has discount-window access and FDIC insurance. A broker-dealer has neither, and SIPC membership does not cover repo exposure. ⚠️ And the parent is a digital-asset company, so a blockchain-native certificate issuer now finances about 36% of its reserve through a crypto-owned dealer: the issuer and its largest reserve counterparty are exposed to the same sector shock, which is precisely the diversification UMB was supplying. ✅ Not a related party of Figure — Ripple is unconnected to FTS.
⚠️ Two limits on the above, stated rather than left implicit. Those financials are 2025-12-31 against a 2026-06-30 exposure, and the firm registered as a security-based swap entity on 2026-09-10 (SBSE-BD and SBSE-C), which is a change in what it does. ⚠️ The same filing also discloses $100M of repo outstanding with Ripple itself at 2025-12-31 — small against a $37.77B book, but its own repo counterparty list includes its parent. The collateral was overnight Treasuries, so quality was high; the concentration was nonetheless a single point of failure rather than a diversified book. The filings establish that YLDS backing is cash, Treasuries, and Treasury repo—not home-equity loans. Holding wYLDS on its own earns only the certificate’s own Treasury-linked rate; the HELOC facility is entered by staking into PRIME, which is what routes the underlying certificates into it. ⚠️ And that facility is not purely HELOC, which is measurable today rather than a consequence of anything pending. The Democratized Prime pool holds four classes of pledged loan collateral — HELOC, non-qualified HELOC, Residential Transition Loans and DSCR rental-property loans — the last two being investor-property credit rather than owner-occupied home equity. ⚠️ The share of each is not computable, because the loan-token decimals are unresolved. ✅ Figure’s acquisition of Kiavi, closed 2026-09-01, adds to those classes rather than introducing them — the companies say more than $100M monthly. ✅ This does not change what backs wYLDS itself, which the filings put in cash, Treasuries and Treasury repo. It changes what a wYLDS holder would be entering by staking. See PRIME and Figure.
The wrapper is less tidy than the underlying certificate. Independent chain reads found slightly more YLDS than the wYLDS it backs, consistent with full coverage, but most identified YLDS sat in Figure operational accounts rather than a clearly ring-fenced wYLDS reserve. An outside reader can verify balances but still depends on Hastra’s account mapping. There is no pre-funded buffer — the redeem vault holds cents while requests queue — so exits require administrator fulfillment and an off-chain YLDS sale.
Hastra is closer to Figure than an arm’s-length wrapper issuer. Figure’s filings name Signum Ltd., doing business as Hastra, as a related party, not a consolidated subsidiary. A December 2025 agreement grants Hastra a nontransferable licence to Figure software whose initial term runs to December 2028 and renews annually thereafter, and charges a 0.50% royalty on protocol transaction revenue. Figure records YLDS held by Hastra as “Debt, current to related parties.” This reduces the unknown-counterparty concern but increases correlated-failure and contractual dependency. The filings do not show that Hastra is controlled by Figure’s parent, and they do not establish that its YLDS belongs to FCC’s $473M parent-controlled holdings.
⚠️ This question is now testable on a date, and it was not before. Hastra’s wYLDS reserve holds 604,547,163 YLDS, which exceeds FCC’s entire certificate reserve at quarter-end ($557.494M). ⚠️ Do not read that against the supply figure above as a coverage ratio — wYLDS supply is 606,675,080 measured 2026-09-11 while the reserve figure is from an earlier read, and two numbers taken on different dates do not make a ratio. Establishing coverage needs both legs read on one date. That is not a contradiction — the readings are 7.7 weeks apart, and it simply implies at least 8.4% growth in the certificate book since 30 June, which is unremarkable for a book that turned over roughly $950M gross in the quarter. It cannot be tested now because our wYLDS supply history does not reach back to June or July.
But it gives a clean test with a date. At the Q3 10-Q, expected around 2026-11-14, compare FCC’s third-party certificate line against Hastra’s wYLDS reserve holdings as at the same date. If the reserve exceeds the third-party line, Hastra’s certificates are necessarily related-party and this question closes by arithmetic rather than by disclosure. With third-party certificates now at $78.497M and the wYLDS reserve above $600M, that test looks likely to resolve — but likely is not the same as established, and this report does not treat it as answered.
Ethereum is now the larger of the two deployments, while the overwhelming majority of Solana wYLDS is locked inside PRIME, leaving only a few million genuinely unstaked. wYLDS is therefore best understood as a wrapper and staking substrate with a thin standalone market, not a broadly liquid Treasury token.
At a glance
| Backing | FCC’s Q2-2026 filing reported $561.627M of qualified assets against a $557.494M certificate reserve at 30 June 2026 — 100.74% coverage, improved from 100.30% at 31 March. ⚠️ Read the composition alongside it: the reserve fell 7.0% over the quarter and the whole contraction was external — third-party holdings −37.2% while related-party holdings rose 1.0%, so coverage improved partly because the denominator shrank. Independent chain reads and Hastra’s own proof of reserves both also show wrapper coverage above 100%. Three separate channels agree on the direction, which matters more than any one figure: they measure different things on different dates. Identified wrapper reserves exist but are not demonstrably ring-fenced. |
| How to redeem | Request wYLDS→USDC and wait for Hastra to sell YLDS, or use a thin Solana DEX. Recent requests cleared 1:1, typically well under an hour. |
| Liquidity | Thin standalone DEX market. The overwhelming majority of Solana wYLDS is locked in PRIME, leaving only a few million genuinely unstaked. |
| Yield | Around 3%, paid monthly as additional tokens from the underlying YLDS return; the rate floats with short-term interest rates. |
| Admin & custody | Hastra runs redemption and retains freeze controls. It is a disclosed Figure related party using licensed Figure software, but is not a Figure subsidiary. |
| Regulated? | FCC/YLDS is SEC-registered and KPMG-audited. Hastra and wYLDS are not, so retail recourse still runs through the wrapper operator. |
| Biggest risk | Strong underlying assets sit beneath a non-segregated, admin-mediated wrapper with essentially no ready USDC redemption buffer. |
1 · Stability — 7.0
wYLDS targets $1 and distributes yield as additional tokens rather than allowing the quoted price to compound upward. It has generally traded close to par. Realistic observed drawdowns have been around 2–3%; the quoted $1.07 high appears to be a low-liquidity seed-pool print rather than evidence of meaningful appreciation. This is strong price behavior for a young wrapper.
The stability comes from a credible certificate reserve and working primary conversion, not deep secondary liquidity. Thin pools can print temporary discounts even when the backing remains sound. Ethereum’s majority supply and the very small freely trading Solana float mean a single aggregate price can hide materially different depth across venues. Issuer freeze controls also mean price stability is not the only risk a holder faces.
FCC’s filing data improves confidence in the reference value. Qualified assets exceeded the reserve, and certificate holders may surrender at face plus accrued interest. But wYLDS is one layer removed from that right: Hastra holds and redeems YLDS on users’ behalf. A disruption at Hastra, a delayed off-chain sale, or a loss of DEX incentives can create a wrapper discount without any impairment to FCC’s assets. More stress-period observations and deeper unincentivized pools would support a higher volatility score.
2 · Backing — 5.0
YLDS is a face-amount certificate issued by FCC and backed by qualified assets under §28 of the Investment Company Act. FCC is a reporting registrant in its own right, and KPMG has served as auditor since 2024; its FY2025 audit carried a clean opinion, no going-concern qualification, and no identified material weakness. ✅ That is materially stronger evidence than a token dashboard or an issuer attestation, because the reserve and asset test appear in recurring SEC filings with officer certifications. Coverage and composition are set out under “At a glance” above and are not repeated here. ⚠️ What holds this at 5.0 rather than higher is the wrapper, not the certificate: identified wrapper reserves exist but are not demonstrably ring-fenced, and the quarter’s coverage improvement came partly from a shrinking denominator — third-party holdings fell 37.2% while related-party holdings rose 1.0%.
3 · Liquidity & Exit — 4.0
This remains the weakest axis. Standalone DEX volume has been a few tens of thousands of dollars a day, small relative to a wrapper supply measured in hundreds of millions. Independent Solana reads found the overwhelming majority of Solana wYLDS locked inside PRIME, leaving only a few million of genuine unstaked float. Aggregators that treat the entire token supply as circulating materially overstate what can trade.
Ethereum is now the larger of the two deployments, but wYLDS primarily functions there as a route into PRIME rather than a deep standalone market. A holder can request primary redemption, yet that process is administered rather than atomic and depends on off-chain YLDS sales. There is no large trustless venue that reliably absorbs institutional size near par.
The thinness of that standalone market is a direct consequence of PRIME absorbing almost all of the supply — and PRIME is now itself the collateral behind a large amount of leveraged borrowing. An unwind there would return wYLDS to holders at exactly the moment there is nowhere liquid to sell it, since wYLDS’s own market is a fraction of the size. The wrapper’s exit therefore depends on Hastra’s administered redemption in precisely the scenario where it is most stressed. That is why wYLDS can score higher overall than PRIME while still being the less immediately exitable of the two.
FCC’s activity shows that the base certificate is not the obvious bottleneck: $530.5M was issued and $263.4M surrendered in Q1 against a roughly $600M ending reserve, and Q2 processed more — $452.7M issued against $499.4M paid for surrenders, on a book that ended the quarter at $557.5M. This proves that the YLDS layer has processed large surrenders; it does not mean wYLDS or PRIME can redeem $263.4M on demand. Wrapper queue capacity, administrator responsiveness, chain settlement, and secondary depth remain separate constraints. A funded USDC reserve and sustained six- or seven-figure DEX depth would be the clearest improvements.
4 · Dependencies — 5.5
This axis asks what the token passes through and who it depends on at each hop — a different question from collateral quality, which is carried by Backing above at 5.0.
The chain is wYLDS → YLDS (issued by FCC) → Figure, and one company sits at every hop. ⚠️ The dependency that matters most is stated in FCC’s own filing: its interim liquidity and going-concern note concludes it has twelve months of funding specifically because its parent has committed, by letter, to pay its invoices directly and periodically forgive intercompany balances. ⚠️ That is a conditional conclusion resting on parent support, not an independent one — and it is a dependency fact, not a collateral fact, which is precisely why it belongs on this axis and not on Backing.
✅ 5.5 is set EQUAL to hastra-prime, not notched above it. hastra-prime runs the identical chain plus a PRIME staking layer, and scores 5.5 on Dependencies. A wrapper is scored equal to its underlying on the underlying’s own axis rather than notched, so a shorter chain does not earn a higher number here. The shorter chain is genuinely less exposed, and that difference is priced on the other axes rather than by inflating this one.
Figure, the company behind this token, is covered separately in Figure.
⚠️ Updated to the Q2-2026 filing (2026-08-14; unaudited, like Q1). At June 30, FCC reported $561.627M of qualified assets against a $557.494M certificate reserve — coverage of 100.74%, up from 100.30% at March 31, with the surplus more than doubling from $1.818M to $4.133M.
⚠️ But read the composition, not the ratio, because they moved in opposite directions. The certificate reserve fell 7.0% over the quarter, and the entire contraction was external:
| Mar-2026 | Jun-2026 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Certificate reserve | $599.706M | $557.494M | −7.0% |
| — related parties | $472.990M | $477.536M | +1.0% |
| — third parties | $125.057M | $78.497M | ⚠️ −37.2% |
| §28 coverage | 100.30% | 100.74% | improved |
Related-party holdings rose $4.5M while third-party holdings fell $46.6M, taking the related-party share of fully-paid certificates from about 78.9% to about 85.9%. The filing’s own flows corroborate it rather than merely permitting it: $452.7M issued against $499.4M paid for surrenders, a net −$46.7M against a third-party decline of −$46.56M. That is roughly $950M of gross churn netting to an external outflow — an active book losing outside holders, not a dormant one drifting.
⚠️ And this is precisely why the coverage ratio is the wrong thing to watch here. Coverage improved because the denominator fell: the reserve shrank faster than the assets backing it. A reader tracking only the percentage sees a strengthening quarter. This is the mirror image of the framework used in thUSD’s report, where matched dollars added to both sides lifted a sub-100% ratio without improving the shortfall — same lesson from the other direction. A ratio can improve because the thing it measures got smaller.
None of that is a backing alarm, and it should not be read as one. Coverage is above 100%, the surplus doubled, the §28 test is intact, and the strength of the SEC channel as evidence — recurring filings, officer certifications, a clean KPMG opinion on FY2025 — is unchanged. What changed is what that channel is describing: a certificate book that is now 86% related-party.
For the Q1 comparison retained below: at March 31, FCC’s unaudited Q1 interim filing reported $601.524M of qualified assets against a $599.706M certificate reserve, approximately 100.3% coverage. The fair-value hierarchy showed $211.3M of Level 1 Treasuries and money-market funds, $389.6M of Level 2 Treasury-collateralized repo, and Level 3 assets of zero. This composition directly confirms that YLDS backing is not exposed to Figure’s HELOC business. The asset pool is high quality, and cash held outside the investment portfolio was just $0.7M, at a single bank.
One structural point deserves more weight than the coverage ratio. The certificates are explicitly unsecured obligations of Figure Certificate Company, backed solely by its assets. The qualified assets sit on deposit at a custodian because the Investment Company Act requires it, but that is a regulatory asset test, not a security interest — a certificate holder is an unsecured creditor of FCC, not the beneficiary of a bankruptcy-remote trust. ⚠️ That legal point is the load-bearing one, and it stands on its own: there is no bankruptcy-remote ring-fence at either layer of the stack, and coverage can be 100.3% while that remains true.
⚠️ What does NOT support it any more is co-mingling, and this report should say so rather than let the premise sit. An earlier reading treated the reserve as co-mingled and not independently reconstructable, on the basis that the two proof-of-reserve “pool” addresses held no bank-module YLDS. Those addresses are repo-token CW20 contracts and were never meant to hold it — the reserve reconstructs exactly, $607,474,509 summing to total backing with no residual, through CW20 receipt queries the original reading never made. So the reserve is reconstructable, and a reader should not carry the opposite impression from this page.
✅ What replaces it is weaker but real, and it is concentration rather than opacity: about 99.7% of the backing sits in a single Provenance account. That is a genuine single-point exposure. It is not the same claim as co-mingling, and it does not carry the same weight — one says nobody can see the reserve, the other says everyone can see it and it is in one place.
Residual risks explain why this does not score still higher. About 50% of qualified assets are repo rather than outright Treasuries — $282.361M of $561.910M at 30 June, down from roughly 65% at 31 March. The repo is short-dated and government-collateralized. ⚠️ The concentration has moved rather than eased, and the mechanism is worth stating precisely: a facility that was documented but UNUSED at 31 March was drawn to $200,000K by 30 June, while the UMB leg fell from $389.556M to $82,361K and the repo book itself shrank 27.5%. That is a standing line being switched on, not a new counterparty appearing — a decision taken inside the quarter. See the Schedule I split above for who now holds it. The collateral is overnight Treasuries, so quality is high; the concentration is nonetheless a single point of failure rather than a diversified book. FCC disclosure also arrives with roughly a 45-day lag—the March 31 quarter was filed May 15—so it is a confirming layer beneath live chain data. Most importantly, wYLDS holders do not own YLDS directly; they hold an unregulated wrapper claim mediated by Hastra. Strong base assets do not prove wrapper-level segregation or bankruptcy remoteness.
5 · Contract & Admin — 6.0
The token itself, measured 2026-09-11 so a reader can check it — with a fabricated address returning nothing in the same pass:
| leg | address | supply | shape |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | 0x6aD038cA6C04e885630851278ca0a856Ad9a66Cc | 454,494,951.73 | ERC-1967 proxy → impl 0x06e0b9155a3cf07f41ac826ccfee7ef8413a9723 |
| Solana | 8fr7WGTVFszfyNWRMXj6fRjZZAnDwmXwEpCrtzmUkdih | 152,180,128.76 | SPL Token mint, 6 decimals |
Total supply 606,675,080.49, 74.9% on Ethereum. ⚠️ The Ethereum leg is a proxy and the EIP-1967 admin slot is empty — upgrade authority runs through AccessControl roles on the implementation, not through a proxy admin. UPGRADER_ROLE and PAUSER_ROLE both exist, and their role IDs are the standard OpenZeppelin keccak values, checked against the contract rather than assumed.
⚠️ Who holds those roles cannot be read from chain state. The contract reports AccessControlEnumerable as false and getRoleMemberCount reverts, so there is no way to ask it who can upgrade. An empty answer there means the question is unsupported, not that nobody holds the role. The upgrade path exists and its holders are unenumerable.
On Solana the mint authority is AJuGsS1NrHgxpHgUu7AgCvshFGL8WdRwxks9sfAVhNQM and the freeze authority 8A18H7n3atDfQsN8rLvt98hj5WZJWwhqqR8digDvbia6. ⚠️ Both are unfunded accounts holding no lamports and no data — the state of a cold key that has never itself paid a fee. ✅ That reads identically to an address that does not exist, and the only reason it is legible here is that both were returned by the mint itself rather than looked up — an authority named by its own subject is a designation, an address that merely returns nothing is not evidence of anything.
⚠️ As everywhere on this site, none of that establishes custody. Unfunded keypairs prove there is no on-chain quorum; MPC and HSM arrangements are off-chain and unreadable.
The wrapper code is open source and has two meaningful reviews. Informal Systems identified and closed a critical vault-account validation bug plus a share-inflation issue. Sherlock later reviewed both Solana and Ethereum implementations and found no critical or high-severity issues. The sequence—serious flaws found, remediated, then reviewed again—is stronger than a clean but shallow one-off audit, although the original flaws show the consequences of implementation error.
Reserve architecture is the principal negative. Hastra’s proof of reserves and public-chain balances show wrapper coverage a little over 100%, while FCC’s filing separately shows its certificate reserve was covered above 100% at 31 March 2026. These are different measures on different dates, not a single matching ratio. Yet the PoR “pool” labels do not map cleanly to the accounts holding most YLDS. The identified balances sat in Figure operational accounts, including an account that also held tokenized loan assets. Total coverage can be checked; a clean, ring-fenced wYLDS reserve and its bankruptcy-remoteness cannot be established from balances alone.
The new corporate evidence adds positives and negatives rather than forcing a score change. Hastra is a disclosed Figure related party, not a consolidated subsidiary. Its YLDS is recorded as current debt to a related party; it pays a 50-basis-point revenue royalty and relies on a nontransferable Figure software licence whose initial term runs to December 2028 and renews annually thereafter. That reduces the uncertainty of dealing with an unidentified arm’s-length wrapper but increases correlated-failure and licence termination or breach risk. Separately, FCC reported 85.9% of certificates held by Figure’s parent and entities controlled by that parent at 30 June 2026, up from 79% at 31 March — and ⚠️ the rise came from outside holders leaving rather than affiliates arriving, as set out above. The filing does not place Hastra in that group, so no such inference is made here. ⚠️ FCC’s own equity cushion, three dates, because the two endpoints hide the quarter between them:
| total assets | equity | equity/assets | leverage | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 Dec 2025 | $329.803M | $584K | 0.177% | 565:1 |
| 31 Mar 2026 | $601.847M | $292K | 0.0485% | 2,061:1 |
| 30 Jun 2026 | $562.000M | $994K | 0.177% | 565:1 |
⚠️ The level is the finding — 565:1 on a regulated retail certificate issuer — and it is flat between the two ends rather than deteriorating. ⚠️⚠️ But the quarter in between ran at 2,061:1, about 3.6× thinner than either endpoint, so a Dec-to-Jun comparison describes a stable cushion and conceals a quarter in which it was a quarter as thick. ✅ The structural reason is unchanged and it is why the number is small by design rather than by stress: Figure’s parent pays FCC’s operating expenses directly, so FCC retains almost no earnings. A thin cushion on an issuer whose expenses are met by someone else is a statement about the parent’s commitment, not about FCC’s solvency — and the §28 asset test is what the certificates actually rest on. ✅ The mechanism is explicit in the filings: the parent pays FCC’s operating expenses directly — $471K in Q1 2026 — and records them as capital contributions.
⚠️ The dip is explained by the two components rather than by anything happening to the reserve, and they reconcile exactly:
| paid-in capital | accumulated deficit | = equity | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31 Dec 2025 | $4,259K | $(3,675)K | $584K |
| 31 Mar 2026 | $4,930K | $(4,638)K | $292K |
| 30 Jun 2026 | $5,477K | $(4,483)K | $994K |
FCC lost $963K in Q1 against a $671K capital top-up, which is what took equity to $292K; Q2 earned $155K against a $547K top-up and restored it. ✅ So the cushion is the running difference between expenses the parent absorbs and contributions it makes — ⚠️ which is why the going-concern assessment rests on a parent commitment letter rather than on FCC’s own resources. This is a pass-through structure, not evidence that reserve assets are missing or that FCC is distressed, but it is a parent-dependency channel. FCC’s interim filing concludes it has twelve months of liquidity specifically because its parent committed, by letter, to pay invoices directly and periodically forgive intercompany balances. That conclusion depends on continued parent support. Live mint and freeze authority, majority-Ethereum implementation exposure, and unproven wrapper segregation keep the structural score at 6.0 despite the stronger audited base layer.
6 · Issuer — 6.5
⚠️ Two parties, and a reader should not merge them. The certificate issuer is Figure Certificate Company, SEC-registered and KPMG-audited. The wrapper operator is Hastra, which is not registered, not audited as an issuer, and not a Figure subsidiary — it is a disclosed Figure related party using licensed Figure software. ✅ The regulated half is genuinely regulated; ⚠️ retail recourse runs through the unregulated half, because it is Hastra that operates redemption and holds freeze controls.
Redemption — 6.5 (retained, folded into Liquidity & Exit)
Minting is permissionless and atomic: a user supplies USDC and receives wYLDS. The reverse path is a two-stage operational process. A holder submits a redemption request, Hastra sells YLDS through Figure Markets, and an administrator completes the wYLDS-to-USDC transaction. An eight-day sample showed about six redemptions a day, paid 1:1 to the cent and typically completed well under an hour. That is concrete evidence of a working normal-market process.
There is no pre-funded buffer behind that timing — the redeem vault holds cents while requests queue. Identified balances included about a million YLDS alongside pending amounts. Off-hours requests sometimes extended into the next business day. A single fulfiller, market-hour dependency, and the need to move value across Figure’s regulated venue leave the process exposed during a run even though it has behaved well in calm conditions.
The independent FCC channel materially improves the bottom of the stack. Certificates are surrenderable at face plus accrued interest, and $263.4M was surrendered in Q1 2026. That throughput supports the existing redemption score because it indicates YLDS liquidity is real. It does not repair the wrapper bottleneck or establish equivalent wYLDS capacity. Multiple fulfillers, a meaningful USDC buffer, explicit service levels, and performance through a stress period would justify moving above 6.5.
Bottom line
FCC’s audited FY2025 statements and unaudited Q1 interim filing show $601.524M of §28 qualified assets against a $599.706M reserve at 31 March 2026, just over 100% coverage. Independent chain reads and Hastra’s proof of reserves separately show wrapper coverage above 100%. The sources agree on the direction, not a single ratio: they measure different things on different dates. The assets are transparent and high quality: Treasuries, money-market funds, and Treasury-collateralized repo, with no Level 3 exposure. The filings also show substantial YLDS-layer redemption throughput.
The wrapper does not inherit all of those protections. wYLDS holders do not directly own or surrender YLDS. They rely on Hastra to map reserve accounts, sell certificates, return USDC, maintain two chain implementations, and exercise mint and freeze controls responsibly. Normal redemptions have been quick and exact, but the immediate USDC buffer is effectively zero and secondary liquidity is thin.
The corporate relationship is clearer but not simpler. Hastra is a Figure related party—not a subsidiary—and runs on licensed Figure software whose initial term runs through December 2028 and renews annually thereafter. Commercial closeness makes the operator less opaque while increasing correlated-failure and termination risk. FCC’s 85.9% parent-and-affiliate certificate concentration and parent-funded operating model add dependency at the base issuer. Those negatives offset the major evidentiary improvement from the reserve disclosure.
The 6.0 score therefore holds, but it now rests on a better-separated assessment: a strong, regulated, independently corroborated underlying; a functional but administrator-mediated redemption path; and a wrapper whose segregation, liquidity, and legal claim remain weaker than the certificate beneath it. wYLDS can fit holders comfortable with an operator-run Treasury wrapper. It does not provide direct regulated recourse, deep instant liquidity, or a stress-proven redemption reserve.
Watch items: reserve segregation and legal claim; standing USDC and redemption-queue growth; Ethereum/Solana supply reconciliation; post-incentive liquidity; FCC’s Q2 filing expected around mid-August; parent-related certificate concentration; and termination or breach of the Figure software licence the protocol runs on.
This report uses public documentation, market data, two published audits, independent Solana, Ethereum, and Provenance reads, and FCC filings available through EDGAR. YLDS is folded in as wYLDS’s backing. Corrections welcome to info@tidresearch.com.
Revision history
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2026-09-09 — Issuer 6.5 added; the co-mingling premise is withdrawn; no other score moves. The Issuer axis was absent on both surfaces and scores Figure Certificate Company the entity — a full SEC reporting registrant filing 10-K/10-Q with officer certifications, KPMG-audited since 2024 with a clean opinion. Held below 7 because the audit opinion covers only the annual statements and the interim going-concern conclusion is conditional on parent support. Set equal to hastra-prime’s 6.5, since the axis scores the entity rather than the wrapper. ⚠️ Separately, the reserve is reconstructable and this page had implied otherwise: it sums exactly to $607,474,509 with no residual via CW20 receipt queries. The earlier co-mingling reading rested on two proof-of-reserve “pool” addresses holding no bank-module YLDS — they are repo-token contracts that were never meant to. The unsecured-creditor conclusion is unaffected and stands on the legal structure; what replaces co-mingling is concentration — about 99.7% of backing in a single Provenance account.
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2026-09-09 — migrated to the six-axis frame; Dependencies re-based and Backing added. ⚠️ The asset did not get worse and nothing adverse arrived. Under the previous rubric one field was labelled Underlying and its rationale argued collateral quality — what FCC’s assets are. The six-axis core renders that same field as Dependencies, which asks what the token passes through and who it depends on at each hop. Two different questions had been sharing one number. The collateral-quality case did not disappear; it moved to a Backing axis that now exists and scores 5.0, and Dependencies was re-argued from the passthrough chain at 5.5 — equal to hastra-prime, which runs the identical chain plus a staking layer, per the wrapper rule that a wrapper is scored equal to its underlying rather than notched. An Issuer paragraph was added at 6.5, separating the SEC-registered certificate issuer from the unregistered wrapper operator through which retail recourse actually runs. Overall 6.0 → 5.5: the earlier 6.0 was held because it sat exactly at the mean of the then-published axis set, and that set no longer exists — with Backing added and Dependencies re-based the mean is 5.667, so 5.5 keeps the same below-its-own-mean convention rather than abandoning it. Redemption 6.5 is retained but no longer rendered, since the six-axis core folds exit into Liquidity & Exit; its paragraph remains as that axis’s evidence. Published and internal now agree on every axis.
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2026-08-23 — refreshed to FCC’s Q2-2026 10-Q (filed 2026-08-14, unaudited). At 30 June: qualified assets $561.627M against a $557.494M certificate reserve — coverage 100.74%, up from 100.30%, with the surplus rising from $1.818M to $4.133M. ⚠️ Coverage improved because the denominator fell. The reserve contracted 7.0% and the whole contraction was external: third parties $125.057M → $78.497M, −37.2%, while related parties rose 1.0% to $477.536M, taking the related-party share from about 78.9% to 85.9%. Flows corroborate it — $452.7M issued against $499.4M surrendered, net −$46.7M. Not a backing alarm: coverage is above 100%, the surplus doubled and the §28 test is intact. ⚠️ A test with a date: at the Q3 10-Q, expected around 2026-11-14, compare FCC’s third-party certificate line against Hastra’s wYLDS reserve holdings as at the same date — if the reserve exceeds the third-party line, Hastra’s certificates are necessarily related-party.
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2026-07-30 — figures restated as ranges. Supply, collateralization, yield rate, standalone volume and staked share are given as ranges rather than point-in-time values. The Figure software licence renews annually after its initial term, and cash at bank is $0.7M.
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2026-07-27 — Structural 6.5 → 6.0, Overall 6.5 → 6.0. Backing confirmed 1:1, reserve co-mingled rather than segregated, liquid redemption buffer approximately nil, Ethereum now the majority deployment.
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2026-07-25 — published at 6.5, replacing the standalone YLDS report.